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Abstract
Russia and Ukraine are countries with relatively large untapped agricultural potentials, both in terms
of abandoned agricultural land and substantial yield gaps. Here we present a comprehensive
assessment of Russian and Ukrainian crop production potentials and we analyze possible impacts of
their future utilization, on a regional as well as global scale. To this end, the total amount of available
abandoned land and potential yields in Russia and Ukraine are estimated and explicitly implemented
in an economic agricultural sector model. We find that cereal (barley, corn, and wheat) production in
Russia and Ukraine could increase by up to 64% in 2030 to 267 million tons, compared to a baseline
scenario. Oilseeds (rapeseed, soybean, and sunflower) production could increase by 84% to 50
million tons, respectively. In comparison to the baseline, common net exports of Ukraine and Russia
could increase by up to 86.3 million tons of cereals and 18.9 million tons of oilseeds in 2030,
representing 4% and 3.6% of the global production of these crops, respectively. Furthermore, we find
that production potentials due to intensification are ten times larger than potentials due to
recultivation of abandoned land. Consequently, we also find stronger impacts from intensification at
the global scale. A utilization of crop production potentials in Russia and Ukraine could globally save
up to 21 million hectares of cropland and reduce average global crop prices by more than 3%.
1. Introduction
Global population and consumption levels, and conse-
quently global food demand, are expected to increase
substantially in the coming decades (Godfray et al
2010, Tilman et al 2011). Furthermore, the recent striv-
ing of many countries towards a transformation to
‘bio-based economies’ indicates a growing competition
for biomass for food, feed, fiber and fuel production
purposes (Lewandowski 2015).
These prospects have caused a discussion about
how additional agricultural production can sustainably
be facilitated. The utilization of idle agricultural poten-
tials is one identified option. On the one hand,
agricultural production may be intensified, since many
regions face large yield gaps between biophysically
attainable and current yields (Godfray et al 2010,
Mueller et al 2012, GYGA 2017). On the other
hand, some potentially available cropland with low
environmental or social trade-offs could be taken into
production (Lambin et al 2013).
Russia and Ukraine are countries with relatively
large untapped agricultural potentials, both in terms
of abandoned agricultural land and existing yield
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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gaps (Schierhorn et al 2014a, Ryabchenko and Non-
hebel 2016). After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
during the 1990s, the agricultural sectors of former
Soviet countries were suddenly faced with increas-
ing international competition, while at the same time
input- and output-subsides were drastically reduced
(Nefedova 2011, Lerman et al 2004). The rural pop-
ulation increasingly left the countryside (Ioffe et al
2004, Prishchepov et al 2013), fertilizer consumption
dropped significantly (Schaffartzik et al 2014, Swinnen
et al 2017) and agricultural productivity and output
declined (Bokusheva et al 2012). The livestock sector
was particularly affected and an enormous decline in
livestock production resulted in diminishing demand
for animal feed (Liefert et al2013). These developments
led to strong declines in land use and average yields in
the first years of transition.
Despite recent recultivation trends, vast amounts
of abandoned cropland are still frequently reported
(Meyfroidt et al 2016, Smaliychuk et al 2016, Schier-
horn et al 2013). Also yields increased again during
the 2000s. Yet, yield gaps in Russia and Ukraine
remain significant, mainly due to limitations in nutri-
ent and water application (Schierhorn et al 2014b,
Mueller et al 2012).
Low input application rates reflect the high volatil-
ity of returns in agriculture, which—in combination
with insufficient insurance systems—incentivize pro-
ducers in Russia and Ukraine to limit inputs to avoid
financial losses (Bobojonov et al 2014, Schierhorn
et al 2014a). In the past, the Russian and Ukrainian
governments additionally increased the price risk by
imposing temporary export restriction as a response
to harvest failure to protect domestic consumers in
the short run (Fellmann et al 2014).
Furthermore, higher investments in the physical
infrastructure, particularly in storing and transporta-
tion capacities, but also in modernization of farm
equipment, are required to facilitate a substantial
increase of agricultural production in Russia and
Ukraine (Liefert et al 2013, Smaliychuk et al 2016).
However, existing credit institutions limit capital avail-
ability, and the absence of functioning land markets
and property right protection hampers private invest-
ments (Lioubimtseva and Henebry 2012, Nizalov et al
2015). Last but not least, the shortage of skilled workers
in the agricultural sector is a major challenge (Liefert
and Liefert 2012). In summary, a substantial increase
of production quantities would likely require major
institutional changes.
In the literature, several studies quantify either
existing yield gaps on already cultivated croplands
(Mueller et al 2012, Schierhorn et al 2014b, GYGA
2017) or the amount of available idle agricultural land
suited for potential recultivation in the region (Lam-
bin et al 2013, Schierhorn et al 2013, Smaliychuk
et al 2016), but only a few studies quantify pro-
duction potentials of both. For instance, Schaffartzik
et al (2014) provide an analysis of production
potentials of rapeseed-based biofuels in Ukraine and
Swinnen et al (2017) analyze wheat production poten-
tials in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Schierhorn
et al (2014a) calculate production potentials for wheat
in European Russia. They estimate that due to a com-
bination of recultivation and increasing yields, wheat
production could be increased by up to 32Mt (mil-
lion tons) under rain fed conditions. For Ukraine,
Ryabchenko and Nonhebel (2016) calculate that in
the short term, wheat production could be increased
by 8.4Mt by taking land and yield potentials into
account. Together, the estimated possible additional
wheat production from unused potentials represents
roughly 6%of the average global annual wheat produc-
tionof theperiod2010–2014 (FAO2016).Thesefigures
exemplify the significance of the untapped agricul-
tural potentials in Russia and Ukraine—for the region
itself as well as for international markets.
In the reviewed studies, however, market effects
from competition with other commodities or produc-
tion in other regions were not taken into account.
We extend existing literature by presenting a com-
prehensive assessment of Russian and Ukrainian crop
production potentials, taking abandoned land and
almost the full set of relevant crops (wheat, barley,
corn, rapeseed, sunflower, soybeans, and potato) into
account. Furthermore, we analyse the impacts a future
utilization of these potentials could have on global crop
prices and land use, since an increasing Ukrainian and
Russian crop production will likely increase exports
and thus, impact production, land use and food prices
elsewhere (Hertel et al 2014).
To this end, we analyze different scenarios
about recultivation and intensification in Russian and
Ukrainian agriculture. In a first step (section 2), we
provide a map of abandoned land in the region, as
well as yield potentials for seven different crops cur-
rently covering 80% of the harvested area in Russia
and 90% in Ukraine. The resulting spatially explicit
datasets are combined with data on production costs
and introduced into a global agricultural sector model
(for a flow chart of the methodology see SI appendix,
section 5). Subsequently, different future scenarios on
the utilization of crop production potentials are spec-
ified (section 3). The underlying idea is to simulate
a removal of institutional and investment obstacles.
Based on these scenarios, we then analyze regional and
global market effects and impacts on land use change
(section 4).
2. Data andmodels
2.1. Abandoned land
A hybrid abandoned land map at a 300 m resolution
for circa 2008–2012 was developed by applica-
tion of a Bayesian approach to integrate different
sources of information. These include land cover
maps from different years, cropland maps, abandoned
2
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Figure 1. A hybrid abandoned agricultural land map. Legend: (1) active cropland; (2) abandoned agricultural land; (3) other land
cover/land use types.
agricultural land maps, statistical datasets and a ref-
erence dataset on cropland and abandoned land that
has been collected via the Geo-Wiki online plat-
form (https://geo-wiki.org/) with the help of regional
experts, who have visually interpreted high-resolution
Bing maps and historical imagery in Google Earth. The
finalmap differentiates between thematic classes ‘active
cropland’, ‘abandoned agricultural land’ and ‘other
land cover/land use types’ (see figure 1). The aban-
doned agricultural land is defined as land that has been
under production in 1990 andwas abandoned formore
than five years afterwards. Land that has been culti-
vated during the period from 2008–2012 is defined as
cropland.
The map has been calibrated with the statistics on
abandoned areas at province level, which we calculated
as the difference between the arable and cultivated area
(FACRE’RF 2011, State Statistics Service of Ukraine
2013). In total 31.2Mha (million hectares) of aban-
doned land are identified in Russia and 2.6Mha in the
Ukraine, respectively. However, it doesn’t mean that
the whole identified abandoned land is directly avail-
able for agricultural production. A detailed description
of the methodology of creating and assessing the
hybrid land cover map is provided in the SI appendix,
section 1 available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/13/025008/
mmedia.
2.2. Yield potentials
Biophysical crop yield potentials and their respective
input requirements for major staple crops in Russia
and the Ukraine were estimated with the global grid-
ded crop model based on EPIC (Balkovicˇ et al 2014,
see SI appendix, section 2). A spatially explicit analysis
was conducted to generate rain-fed (i.e. water-limited)
yield potentials and irrigated yield potentials, account-
ing for different crop management practices and
environmental conditions, including climate, soil, and
terrain. We apply the concept of crop yield potential
described by van Ittersum et al (2013). The yield poten-
tial reflects the yield simulated for a crop cultivar when
water and nutrients are not limiting while other biotic
stresses arenot considered.Thepotentials are estimated
for the climatic conditions of 2000–2010 assuming
the present-day distribution of crops and no cultivar
adaptations are considered. The EPIC-IIASA model
was constructed and parameterized for crop manage-
ment practices around the year 2000 (see input data
summarized in SI appendix, table 1.
On the one hand, yield potential is a theoretical
concept, and it has been observed that yields hardly
exceed 80% of their estimated potential yields (Lobell
et al 2009). On the other hand, experience shows that
EPIC tends tounderestimate yields at higher yield levels
(Balkovicˇ et al 2013, 2014) due to underrepresenting
the high-performing cultivars in advanced agricultural
systems. For the work at hand, we assume that both
effects compensate each other and thus, we apply the
estimated yield potentials directly, implicitly reflecting
80% levels of potential yields.
We compare our yield assumptions2 to attainable
yields as estimated by Mueller et al (2012) (figure 2).
2 Shares of rain-fed and irrigated systems applied according to allo-
cation in theGLOBIOM base year 2000, which are based on You and
Wood (2006).
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Figure 2. Yields and yield potentials (t ha−1) for Ukraine and Russia; AV-FAO: Average of observed yields of the period 2010–2014;
POT (Hist Cl. EPIC): average yield potentials based on EPIC figures under historical climate (compare 2.2); Mueller et al (2012):
attainable average yields as presented in their publication;BL2030:GLOBIOM base year yields plus assumed exogenous growth trends
as applied in the baseline until 2030; POT2030: EPIC yield potentials plus assumed increase in potentials until 2030, as applied in the
YD_high scenario. For the calculation of POT (Hist), BL2030 and POT2030, spatially explicit yields are applied to the area distribution
of the GLOBIOM base year.
Their estimates rely on the assumption that the
highest yields observed in a region with a specific cli-
mate are agoodproxy for themaximumattainable yield
for all other regions with a similar climate. Accord-
ing to Lobell et al (2009), this methodology tends to
underestimate yield potentials. In general, our yield
potentials are similar to the attainable yields of Mueller
et al (2012) except for maize and soybean yields in
Russia, and soybean and wheat in Ukraine, which
are underestimated compared to Mueller et al (2012).
In addition, sunflower was overestimated in Ukraine.
More detailed information is available in section 2 in
the SI appendix. It should be noted that the simulated
period of 2000–2010 differs from that used by Mueller
et al (2012) in their analysis, which makes the compar-
ison less straightforward.
2.3. Market model
The generated datasets on abandoned land and yield
potentials are integrated into the Global Biosphere
Management Model (GLOBIOM, Havlı´k et al 2011,
2014). GLOBIOM is a global recursive dynamic
bottom-up partial equilibrium model integrating the
agricultural, bioenergy and forestry sectors. It is a lin-
ear programming model with a spatial equilibrium
approach (Takayama and Judge 1971). An agricul-
tural and forest market equilibrium is computed, based
on a welfare maximizing objective function subject to
resource, technology, demand and policy constraints.
Model details are presented in SI appendix, section 3.
Russia and Ukraine are represented as single regions in
GLOBIOM, in addition to 30 other regions either rep-
resenting large single countries or country aggregates.
We incorporated information about available
abandoned land (as described above) into GLOBIOM
as an own land use category, adding a new poten-
tial source of cropland and facilitating the simulation
of better accessibility to abandoned land. A detailed
description of the mechanism of land use change in
GLOBIOM is presented in the SI appendix, section 3.3.
In compliance with the EPIC estimates, new ‘high-
input’ production systems (irrigated and rain-fed)
are implemented into GLOBIOM, implicitly reflect-
ing 80% levels of potential yields. For this purpose, we
combine yields and inputs with corresponding, spa-
tially explicit production costs. The production costs
4
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for the new high-input production systems have been
providedby the IIASAAgriCostModel (ACM,compare
SI appendix, section 4). ACM calculates production
costs for different crops and management systems at
the spatial resolution level of the GLOBIOMmodel.
High-input production systems are defined for
wheat, barley, corn, rapeseed, sunflower, soybeans, and
potato production, which together represent 80% of
the area harvested in Russia and 90% in Ukraine,
respectively (FAO2016).Averageyieldsandcosts struc-
tures of the defined high-input production systems,
as well as the current production systems, can be
found in the SI appendix, section 4.3.
3. Scenario description, assumptions, and
quantification
With the described model and model extensions, we
analyze several scenarios, reflecting different invest-
ment and institutional development efforts. These
scenarios are compared to a reference scenario which
reflects future developments without these additional
efforts, the so-called baseline. For the baseline sce-
nario,we refer to theSharedSocio-economicPathway2
(SSP2)which is amiddle-of-the-road scenario (O’Neill
et al 2014) and often is considered as a business-
as-usual scenario (more details can be found in SI
appendix, section 3.4).
We assume that an improved institutional envi-
ronment and increased public and private investments
in the agricultural sectors of Ukraine and Russia
would result in better accessibility of farmers to aban-
doned cropland and would ease a shift in production
structure towards high-input production systems for
crops. To analyze the impacts of such developments,
we run several scenarios simulating better access to
abandoned cropland and high-input systems and com-
binations of them. Scenario details are presented
in the following paragraphs. It shall be emphasized
that our scenarios reflect long-term developments
and thus, do not include current political issues
such as the Russian import ban.
3.1. Recultivation of abandoned land
Abandoned cropland refers to land that has already
been under production in Soviet times, and at least
parts of it can potentially be taken back into produc-
tion. However, it is clear that several constraints for the
uptake of abandoned land exist and that recultivation
of some land can be associated with high environmen-
tal trade-offs in terms of carbon release or biodiversity
losses (Meyfroidt et al 2016, Kurganova et al 2015,
Schierhorn et al 2013).
Thus, we specify two scenarios with different
levels of recultivation attempts of abandoned land.
For the definition of a more conservative scenario
(‘CONS’) that sets a relatively small share of the
abandoned land as de facto available, we refer to
Meyfroidt et al (2016). In their paper, they categorize
abandoned cropland in Russia and Ukraine according
to the strengths of different constraints (socioeco-
nomic, accessibility, agro-environmental) and also
define land that is connected to high environmen-
tal trade-offs. Out of 31.4Mha total abandoned land
in Russia and 2.6Mha in the Ukraine, they spec-
ify 5.3Mha and 0.9 Mha, respectively, as potentially
available cropland with no strong trade-offs, low socio-
economic and accessibility constraints and favorable
agro-environmental conditions.We calibrate theGLO-
BIOM model to recultivate the amount of potentially
available cropland as identified by Meyfroidt et al by
2030.When land is recultivated, the assumption is that
productivity is the same as in the already existing neigh-
boring cropland, which may lead to an overestimation
of productivity of recultivated land since less fertile
lands were likely abandoned first (Prishchepov et al
2013). However, other reasons such as poor accessibil-
ity or labor shortage could have led to abandonment as
well, which don’t necessarily imply lower productivity.
For the more advanced scenario (‘ADV’), we
assume a higher rate of recultivated abandoned land
until 2030 and calibrate the land-conversion func-
tion of the model accordingly. In Russia 9.5 out of
31.2Mha are assumed to be recultivated and for the
Ukraine 1.6 out of 2.6 Mha. These figures are higher
than the potentially available cropland as identified
in the ‘CONS’ scenario, with the underlying assump-
tion that some of the restraining constraints are being
removed. Other studies estimate similar amounts of
abandoned landwith few constraints and no significant
trade-offs for Russia (Lambin et al (2013): 8.7Mha;
Schierhorn et al (2014a): 9.5Mha).
3.2. Increasingyieldsdue tohigh-input systemappli-
cation
The new high-input production systems (as developed
in section 2.2) are activated to run investment scenar-
ios until 2030. This means that the model can choose
between the standard production systems from the
baseline and the newly implemented high-input pro-
duction systems for each grid cell, depending on the
cost-effectiveness of the system. The expansion of irri-
gated high-input systems is restricted to areas where
already irrigated production systems exist in the base
year.
We analyze scenarios with two different intensi-
fication settings. In the first setting, the high-input
production systems as described in 2.2 are imple-
mented into the model (scenario ‘high’). In the
second setting, production systems are implemented
closing only 50% of the yield gap between the actual
yields and the yields as defined for the high-input pro-
duction systems (scenario ‘medium’). The ‘medium’
production systems are based on linear interpolation
between ‘baseline’ and ‘high’ systems.
Since we run scenarios up to the year 2030, some
assumptions need to be made on the developments
5
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Table 1. Scenario combinations. YD (Yield) refers to the assumptions on intensification, LD (Land) is used, when scenario assumptions only
directly affect land use. Detailed scenario descriptions are presented in 3.1 and 3.2.
Recultivation options
current conservative (CONS) advanced (ADV)
Inten-
sification
scenarios
high YD_high YD_high_CONS YD_high_ADV
medium YD_med YD_med_CONS YD_med_ADV
current Baseline LD_CONS LD_ADV
of yields over time. For our baseline scenario, exoge-
nous yield growth shifters are applied, which are based
on estimated yield response functions to GDP per
capita for different income groups of countries (SI
appendix, section 3.4). These shifters represent a mix-
ture of partly closing yield gaps and increasing yield
potentials over time. Thus, exogenous growth shifters
for our estimated high-input production systems need
to be adjusted to reflect that they only represent the
increase that is coming from research and develop-
ment. To this end, we assume that potential yields in
Russia and Ukraine increase with the same rate that is
applied for western European countries3 in our base-
line. The underlying assumption is that in western
Europe, nutrient-limitations have already been closed
to a large extent and hence, estimated shifters capture
the increase of yield potentials by research and devel-
opment. Resulting potential yields for the year 2030 are
presented in figure 2.
3.3. Scenario combinations
It is likely that institutional development and higher
public investments in the agricultural sector would
affect both, land-use change and production system
changes, at the same time. Thus, we combine our recul-
tivation options and high-inputs production systems as
presented in table 1, with the baseline being the refer-
ence scenario with no additional recultivation attempts
and no implementation of high-input production sys-
tems.
4. Results
4.1. Production and trade in Russia and Ukraine
Scenario results for production and trade of cereals
(barley, corn, and wheat; figure 3) suggest that the
impact from intensification on the existing cropland is
larger than the impact from recultivation of abandoned
land. This effect can be observed for both countries
but is more distinct in Ukraine—mostly because land
reserves are higher in Russia than in Ukraine.
All scenarios have in common that large shares of
the additional production translate into net exports.
Domestic consumption (including human consump-
tion, feed demand, processing demand, seed demand)
shows only little response. In our scenarios, we do not
3 In the GLOBIOM set-up, the region ‘Western Europe’ consists of
the countries Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, France Germany and
the Netherlands.
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Figure 3. Cereals (barley, corn, wheat) production and net-
trade in 2030; Overall bar: total production; plain area:
domestic consumption (human consumption, feed, seed, and
processing); patterned area: net-exports.
changeassumptionon livestockproductivity compared
to the baseline. With an increasing productivity in the
livestock sector, however, it is likely that more feed
demand arises within Russia and Ukraine, which in
turn could increase domestic demand for crops and
impact international livestock markets.
For the scenario with the strongest impact
(YD_high_ADV), the full provision of the defined
high-input systems and relatively easy access to aban-
doned land for recultivation is assumed. In this
scenario, cereal production in 2030 in Russia and
Ukraine increases to267 Mt (million tons) from162 Mt
in the baseline, which reflects a 64% increase. The
domestic consumption increases by less than 16% of
baseline levels, but net-export figures almost triple. In
comparison to the baseline, net exports of Ukraine
and Russia increase by 86.3Mt of barley, corn, and
wheat, which represent 4% of the global production
of these crops. A similar result also can be observed
for oilseed production and trade (SI, section 6.1). In
the YD_high_ADV scenario, common net-exports of
sunflower seeds, rapeseeds, and soybeans increase by
18.9Mt in 2030 compared to the baseline, representing
3.5% of global production of these crops in 2030.
In scenarios where intensification is provided as
an option (i.e. in all YD_med and YD_high scenar-
ios), high-input production systems are applied for all
crops on at least 95% of the harvested area, except for
potatoes where the share is around 60%. This may
seem like an extreme step, however, when looking
6
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Figure 4. Cropland use in Ukraine and Russia in 2030. The overall bars indicate the total cropland use for different scenarios. The
upper (dark green) part refers to abandoned land that has been recultivated since 2010 and is used as cropland in 2030. Note: bars are
cut at 18Mha in Ukraine and 35Mha in Russia for better visualization of recultivation effects in the single scenarios.
at western European agriculture (Jepsen et al 2015),
at least in the long run, it is not implausible.
With increasing intensification, we also observe
some specialization effects. Russian cereal production
increases by 70%, while Ukrainian cereal produc-
tion increases by 39% in the strongest intensification
scenario (YD_high). A reverse picture arises for
oilseed production impacts where Russian production
increases by 48% and the Ukrainian production more
than doubles, in comparison to oilseed production in
the baseline.
Sensitivity analysis of production costs of high-
input systems revealed that, despite costs being an
important driver, results were quite robust. Keeping
the costs of the business-as-usual systems constant
and varying the total cost difference between newly
implemented high-input production systems and
business-as-usual systems by up to 20%, generates an
up to 5% decrease in cereal production (SI appendix,
section 7.1).
4.2. Land use in Russia and Ukraine
The different scenarios lead to different developments
of cropland use in Russia and Ukraine (figure 4).
The amount of recultivated land in the scenarios
LD_CONS and LD_ADV reflects the calibrated recul-
tivation assumptions as described in section 3.1. For
these two scenarios, we observe an increase in total
cropland in comparison to the baseline, due to the
better recultivation options. However, with increased
production, prices decrease and production at some
marginal areas is not profitable any longer. Thus,
some marginal cropland that was under production
in the baseline will be abandoned and substituted by
recultivated abandoned land with better agricultural
conditions. Similar land use patterns can be observed
when analyzing the impacts of better recultivation
options on scenarios with higher yield per hectare (i.e.
YD_med_COSN and YD_med_ADV in comparison
to YD_med; and YD_high_COSN and YD_high_ADV
in comparison to YD_high).
In intensification scenarios, an overall land-saving
effect is observed due to the introduction of high-input
production systems. However, the land-saving effect
in YD_med does only occur in Russia and is rela-
tively small, while the additional impact from YD_med
to YD_high is much stronger in both countries.
The mechanism behind this result is, that increasing
marginal trade costs are assumed. Thus, when yields
increase only moderately (YD_med), most of the addi-
tional production will be exported. However, with a
substantial increase of yields and respectively produc-
tion in comparison to the baseline, marginal trade
costs increase stronger and thus, additional production
remains in the country, domestic commodity prices are
going down, and less cropland is being used. Despite
this land-saving effect, intensification, however, can be
connected to substantially higher fertilizer application
rates (SI appendix, chapter 6.2).
4.3. Global impacts
At the global scale, results are in line with the
regional scale: in 2030, impacts from intensification are
stronger than the impacts resulting from recultivation
(figure 5). Yet, compared to regional impacts in Russia
and Ukraine, globally observed land-use effects from
intensification are even stronger. A cropland reduc-
tion of 0.87Mha (3.4 Mha) in Russia and Ukraine
for the YD_med (YD_high) scenario (compared to
the baseline) translates globally into a reduction of
10.8Mha (21.5 Mha) of cropland. This reflects that
due to trade effects, marginal land with, on average,
lower yields is set free from agricultural production
in other regions. More than one quarter (26%) of the
land that globally is saved in the YD_high scenario
appears in former Soviet Union countries (including
Russia and Ukraine), another 25% in Europe and 15%
in Latin America. More details on the distribution of
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Figure 5. Global price and land use effects in 2030. The crop price index is a weighted average of all endogenously calculated crop
prices. The index is set to 1 for the year 2010 (since scenarios are only specified for the years after 2010). Global cropland refers to the
sum of cropland that is used for the production of endogenously represented crops in GLOBIOM.
land savings due to intensification can be found in
the SI, section 6.3.
Global price impacts show as well that the strongest
production gains arise in the intensification scenarios.
Instead of a 0.4% increase in average crop prices com-
pared to 2010, as shown for the baseline, the YD_high
scenario leads to a price drop of 2.7%. The LD_ADV
scenario, in contrast, leads to a price drop of only 0.3%.
Contrary to the intensification scenarios, better
recultivation options in Russia and Ukraine without
simultaneous intensification lead to an increasing land
use at the global scale, since the additional land use in
Russia and Ukraine in the LD_CONS and LD_ADV
scenarios is stronger than land use reductions in the
rest of the world.
With high intensification assumed in the back-
ground, the impact of recultivationonglobal landuse is
almost zero (i.e. YD_high_ADV and YD_high_CONS
versus YD_high). Given the increasing land use in Rus-
sia and Ukraine, this means that for every additional
hectare in this region almost one hectare cropland is
saved elsewhere.
The amount of increased agricultural production
and the respective impact on the global scale are not
solely determined by existing agricultural potentials,
but as well by the global demand for Russian and
Ukrainian crops, and the resulting international price
levels in the baseline (Saraykin et al 2017). Global
demand projections in turn depend on many differ-
ent factors, such as income development, population
growth or trade relations. For all these factors, very
diverse pathways can be projected (e.g. Dellink et al
2017, Kc and Lutz 2017). We, however, apply the
ceteris paribus assumption and do not change these
projections between our scenarios. Testing our scenar-
ios against different projection for all drivers would
be beyond the scope of this article. However, since it is
not unlikely that institutional developmentmay involve
changes in trade relations, we carried out a sensitivity
analysis to test the impacts of different trade specifica-
tions to reflect the uncertainty on the development.
4.4. Potentials and trade openness
Bilateral trade relations in GLOBIOM are represented
by a linearized constant elasticity trade cost function if
bilateral trade flows between two regions are observed
in the base year and by a quadratic cost function if
no trade flows are observed in the base year. When
the elasticity is low, trade costs rise quickly with the
increase in traded quantities while when the elasticity
is high, trade costs rise at a slower pace. To reflect low
trade costs and beneficial international trade relations,
initial trade costs were reduced by 10%, trade cost elas-
ticities were doubled, and the quadratic function was
divided by 2. An opposite development of increasing
trade costs and less beneficial trade relations are intro-
duced by 10% higher initial trade cost, a reduction
of trade cost elasticities by 50% and a multiplication
by 2 of the quadratic cost function.
The analysis reveals the importance of tradeoptions
for the utilization of agricultural potentials in Rus-
sia and Ukraine (figure 6). Impacts are stronger on
production values because in the scenarios produc-
tion values already deviate stronger from the baseline
than land use values. In the standard scenario with
the strongest production impact as presented above
(YD_high_ADV), cerealproduction inRussia increases
by 78% and in Ukraine by 42% compared to baseline
production. If trade relations improve and trade costs
decrease with the better institutional environment and
more investments, cereal production could increase by
98% in Russia and by 62% in Ukraine instead. On the
other hand, if for some reason trade relations worsen
and trade costs increase (compared to the baseline),
cereal production in Russia and Ukraine may increase
only by 46% and 14%, respectively.
At the global scale (SI appendix, section 7.2),
changes in trade costs reveal a trade-off between price
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Figure 6. Sensitivity of cereal production and cropland use in Russia and Ukraine. Values in percent of Baseline 2030 results. The
upper end of the red error bars indicates results from scenarios with low trade costs (ceteris paribus) and the lower end of the error
bars show results from scenarios with higher trade costs (ceteris paribus).
and land use. With higher trade costs, less agricultural
potentials are being used in Russia and Ukraine, result-
ing in lower global land use and higher global price
levels. On the other hand, low trade costs lead to higher
global land use but lower price levels.
5. Discussion and conclusion
We analyzed crop production potentials of Russia
and Ukraine which could be uncovered with higher
investments and institutional improvements. The nov-
elty of our approach is its comprehensiveness (we take
abandoned land and almost the full set of relevant crops
into account) and the application of an agricultural sec-
tor model, which allows for an impact analysis at the
reginal as well as at the global scale.
Our results show that substantial potentials in crop
production do exist in Russia and Ukraine and that
large parts of the additional production canbe exported
toworldmarkets.Wefind that cereal production (here:
barley, corn, and wheat) in Russia and Ukraine could
increase up to 267Mt per year in 2030, representing a
64% increase compared to the baseline production of
162 Mt. Additional net exports of Ukraine and Russia
comprise up to 86.3 Mt, which would represent 4% of
global production of these crops. A similar result can
be observed for oilseed production and trade (here:
rapeseed, soybean, and sunflower). Net-exports could
increase by up to 18.9Mt in 2030, representing 3.5% of
global production in 2030.
These results, however, reflect that in our scenarios
no exogenous changes in livestock production capac-
ities or productivity would take place in Russia and
Ukraine compared to the baseline. With an increased
livestock production, it is likely that a larger share of
crops would be used as animal feed instead of being
exported.This is not unlikely tohappen, especially since
recently more subsidies are directed to the livestock
sectors in the region (Liefert and Liefert 2012).
Our analysis reveals that production potentials
due to intensification are higher than potentials due
to recultivation of abandoned land. In our strongest
scenario, which combines recultivation of abandoned
land with an intensification of crop production, 8%
of the additional cereal and oilseed production in
Ukraine are coming from recultivation of abandoned
land while 92% are coming from intensification of
production on already utilized cropland. These find-
ings correspond with findings in Ryabchenko and
Nonhebel (2016), who estimate that 10% of the
untapped production potentials for wheat in Ukraine
would be connected to land expansion while 90% of
the potentials would be connected to intensification.
Results for EuropeanRussia in Schierhorn et al (2014a)
suggest that a somewhat higher share of 21% of the
untapped wheat production potentials could be gained
from recultivation and 79% from intensification4. In
our study, someof the available abandoned land inRus-
sia is not recultivated when intensification is assumed
because it is not profitable with declining commod-
ity prices. Thus, for Russia, we estimate that only 9%
of additional production is due to recultivation and
91% due to intensification, with some of the available
abandoned land not being recultivated.
On international markets, we consequently find
stronger impacts of intensification. However, both
intensification and recultivation in Russia and Ukraine
would lead to decreasing crop prices and reduced land
use in other parts of the world outside Russia and
Ukraine. We find that the utilization of crop produc-
tion potentials in Russia and Ukraine could globally
4 Own calculations based on Schierhorn et al (2014a) results for
a full yield gap closure scenario under rain-fed conditions and a
recultivation of 4.4Mha cropland.
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save up to 21Mha of cropland and at the same time
reduce average crop prices by more than 3%. Results
show that at the global level more production is pro-
vided at lower prices, which is an important finding
from a food security perspective.
We also show that the level of utilization of agri-
cultural potentials heavily depends on existing trade
options by carrying out a sensitivity analysis of trade
costs assumptions. This needs to be kept in mind when
interpreting the results of our paper.
Globally, changes in trade costs reveal a trade-
off between crop price impacts and land use. Higher
trade costs lead to lower production levels in Russia
and Ukraine, globally (including Russia and Ukraine)
to lower cropland utilization and higher interna-
tional prices. Opposite effects appear with lower
trade costs.
Intensification of agricultural production, on the
one hand, has land saving effects at the global scale.
On the other hand, it can lead to adverse environ-
mental impacts at the local, regional, and even global
level (Matson et al 1997). With intensified production
in Russia and Ukraine, fertilization or pesticide appli-
cation rates will substantially increase in the region
but decline elsewhere. Global application rates rise
slightly in our intensification scenarios. The over-
all environmental impact of intensification, however,
depends on further factors, such as a country’s envi-
ronmental legislation or farmers’ management skills.
We do not explicitly take into account changes of
net fertilization demand that may arise from changes
in farm management practices. With this regard,
an increase in nitrogen use efficiency may be an
important parameter (Reis et al 2016). Furthermore,
depending on the development of the Russian and
Ukrainian livestock sectors, additional positive envi-
ronmental impacts might be generated, taking Russia’s
large beef imports from Brazil and related land-use
change developments in tropical regions into account
(Schierhorn et al 2016).
In the presented intensification scenarios, high
uptake rates of high-input production systems are
observed. For most crops, more than 95% of the har-
vested area is under intensive production. This may
appear as an extreme switch, particularly given the time
frame of our analysis until 2030. It may seem relatively
unlikely that all relevant institutional problems relat-
ing to the Russian and Ukrainian agricultural sectors,
as described in the introduction, can be solved until
then. In themedium to long run, however, a high share
of intensive production systems may not be implausi-
ble, particularly when comparing to the intensification
level of western European agriculture (Jepsen et al
2015). Similarly, our intensification scenarios imply
relatively high annual rates of yield increase for some
crops, which rarely have been observed in the past
(Grassini et al 2013) and thus, represent an optimistic
development. Nevertheless, the scope and direction
of potential developments are plausible and indicate
tendencies towards which Russia and Ukraine may be
heading in the future.
In the paper at hand, different large-scale models
have been applied, which requires many assump-
tions and thus, comprises uncertainties. We addressed
uncertainties related to assumptions on trade and the
cost structure of high-input production systems by
sensitivity analysis with the GLOBIOM model. How-
ever, thepresentedglobal scenariosadditionallydepend
on projections for population developments, income
growth, consumer behavior, and technical progress,
which we do not change between the scenarios. Con-
ducting sensitivity analysis on all of these parameters
would be beyond the scope of this article, but it should
be kept in mind that the utilization of agricultural
potentials in Russia and Ukraine is also influenced by
these factors.
Furthermore, there are some caveats concern-
ing the biophysical EPIC modelling, especially with
respect to insufficiently captured heterogeneity in crop
management practices, including distribution of crop
varieties, cultivation practices, fertilization and irriga-
tion allocation to individual crops (Balkovicˇ et al 2013),
insufficiently captured soil heterogeneity (Folberth
et al 2016), uncertainty of crop yield aggregations (Por-
wollik et al 2016), and limited relevance at small scales
(van Ittersum et al 2013). Owing to granularity in
input data, our estimates of potential yields may not
take into account the best-performing crop varieties
under the given climate and soil conditions, leading
to underestimation of crop yields obtained in high-
productive agricultural systems. In the paper, we try
to account for this by interpreting yield potentials
as implicitly reflecting 80% levels of the potentials,
which is a threshold that hardly is exceeded in real-
ity (Lobell et al 2009). A comparison with attainable
yields estimated by Mueller et al (2012) reveals similar
values for most crops. However, our yield for maize
and soybean in Russia, and soybean and wheat in
Ukraine are lower, while sunflower values are higher,
which may be owing to the described caveats.
Also, production potentials might increase more
if irrigation is extended. In our analysis, we restrict
irrigation expansion to zones where it has been in place
in the base year. This, however, may not be unrealistic
given the fact thatwater availability is limited and future
climate change may even increase water stress (Alcamo
et al 2007).
Climate change impacts are not explicitly consid-
ered inourpaper.However, theymay affect agricultural
production potentials in the future. Impacts of climate
change are predicted to vary across Russia andUkraine.
The northern parts may benefit from higher tempera-
tures and longer growing seasons, yet, yield increases
are expected to be rather moderate due to limited soil
quality in this area. The southern parts where most of
the crop production traditionally is taking place may
be adversely affected by increasing climate variability
(Swinnen et al 2017, Lioubimtseva andHenebry 2012).
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